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The thesis of this Article is that the federal tax law governing the transfer of
property to corporations in exchangefor securities, section 351 of the LAS. Code,
should be changedtofoster the more effective development ofsmall businesses. After
examining the operation and legislative history of section 351, the author explicates
theproblems encountered with the section's control requirement and concludes that
section 351, in current dress, impedes the underlying congressionalpolicy offostering
small businesses. To address this problem, the author advocates that the control
requirement be supplanted by a criterion based on net worth.
INTRODUCTION
THE CURRENT federal tax treatment of property transferred to
small corporations in exchange for stock or securities signifi-
cantly affects the ability of these corporations to acquire assets and
the legal relationships between the contributors of such assets and
the corporation.' In inflationary periods, many property owners
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Smongeski Bequest and the University of Wisconsin Foundation. The author, however,
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Bernadette Ertl and Judith Laufer for their research assistance.
1. A corporation generally does not recognize gain or loss upon the issuance of secur-
ities for cash or other property. I.R.C. § 1032. Purchase of securities with cash involves no
immediate tax consequences for the purchaser. If, however, the purchase is with property
other than cash, the transferor may have to recognize gain or loss equal to the difference
between the adjusted basis of the transferred property and the fair market value of the
securities received. I.R.C. § 1001(a), (b).
One important exception to treating an exchange transaction as a taxable event is con-
tained in § 351 of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code). Section 351 provides for the
nonrecognition of gain or loss, in certain circumstances, on transfers of property to a corpo-
ration in exchange for its stock or securities. For a description of the requirements of
§ 351, see text accompanying notes 14-18 infra. The requirements of § 351 may influence
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may realize substantial capital gains or ordinary income upon the
disposition of property, particularly depreciated property.2
Through nonrecognition of gain and income, and its attendant tax
savings, section 351(a) facilitates the acquisition of property by
small corporations in exchange for securities.3 Such exchanges
may be more advantageous than purchasing assets with either
borrowed money, which entails incurring interest and principal
payments, or money raised through the public sale of equity se-
curities. The equity route is often particularly difficult for small
the transferor's decision whether to transfer property to a corporation and may govern the
nature of the securities received by the transferors. See notes 31-45 infra and accompany-
ing text.
To obtain nonrecognition treatment, a transferor must receive a proprietary, equity in-
terest in the corporation. See notes 39-40 infra and accompanying text. This Article pri-
marily will discuss exchanges in which the transferor receives stock, although the transferor
could receive securities and stock and still qualify for treatment under § 351. I.R.C.
§ 351(a).
In addition, this Article focuses on contributions of property to Subchapter C corpora-
tions, that is, corporations which are subject to all of the provisions of Subchapter C of
Chapter 1 of the Code. Thus, the relevant provisions for tax treatment of contributions to
Subchapter S corporations--corporations electing to be taxed pursuant to the provisions of
Subchapter S of Chapter 1 of the Code-are omitted.
2. The cost of stock received in the exchange is equal to the amount paid for such
property which, in an arm's length exchange, is presumed to be equal to the fair market
value of the relinquished property. Treas. Reg. § 1.1012-1(a) (1957); see Philadelphia Park
Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184 (Ct. Cl. 1954) (where value of property
received in an arm's length transaction was unascertainable, fair market value of relin-
quished property was used to determine fair market value and cost basis of property re-
ceived).
During inflationary periods, the fair market value of the transferred property, which
would be used to compute the fair market value of the stock received, may have increased
over the cost basis of the property, thereby resulting in potential gain recognition equal to
the difference between the cost basis and the increased fair market value of the property. If
an allowance for depreciation has been taken, the basis must be reduced by the amount of
such allowance, and this adjusted basis would further increase the difference between the
fair market value of the stock received and the adjusted basis of the transferred property.
I.R.C. § 1016(a)(2).
3. It has been recognized that § 351 "is of particular importance when individual
proprietorships and partnerships are incorporated." B. BITTKER & J. EusTIcE, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 3-3 (4th ed. 1979).
In this Article, the nonelective provisions of § 351 which guarantee the nonrecognition
of gain are viewed favorably. In certain instances, however, the recognition of gain may be
advisable. See Oberst, Incorporating a Business: Alternatives to a Complete Tax-Free Ex-
change, 3 TAX. FOR LAW. 186 (1974). The potential of double tax and assignment of a tax
detriment when § 351 is used to provide for the nonrecognition of gain has been discussed
and criticized in Thompson, Tax Policy Implications of Contributions of Appreciated and
Depreciated Property to Partnershps, Subehapter C Corporations and Subchapter S Corpora-
tions in Exchange for Ownershp Interests, 31 TAx L. REv. 29 (1975). Moreover, § 351
prohibits the recognition of losses incurred in certain exchange transactions. If, however,
the transferors want to recognize the loss, they often can purposely structure the transaction
to avoid § 351.
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corporations because of market conditions and the cost of compli-
ance with governing securities regulations.4
The current test for entitlement to section 351 is that immedi-
ately after the exchange, the transferors own at least 80% of the
voting stock and 80% of the total number of all other classes of
stock.5 The traditional rationale for section 351 is that transfers
satisfying the control requirement involve only a change in form
rather than substance of ownership, thereby rendering immediate
taxation inappropriate.6 By generating increasingly complicated
conditions for satisfying the control requirement and by strict in-
terpretation,7 judges and administrators employing this "same
substance, different form" rationale have stymied Congress' origi-
nal purpose of facilitating transfers of property to small corpora-
tions in exchange for stock.'
The control requirement and the same substance, different
form rationale, however, are not necessary to achieve the policies
underlying this favorable tax treatment. The continued use, there-
fore, of this requirement and its rationale is counter-productive.
The specific 80% post-transfer stock ownership control require-
ment most likely was adopted arbitrarily as a relatively easy
mechanism for limiting such favorable tax treatment to small cor-
porations.9 Moreover, the same substance, different form ration-
ale is simply invalid in most cases because, under general
corporate law provisions, significant changes in substance of own-
ership occur even after compliance with the control requirement.' 0
The public policy goal of encouraging the development of
small corporations is prevalent in federal law and was a major
factor in the enactment of favorable tax treatment for transfers of
property to certain corporations." It is now evident, however,
that the specific 80% post-transfer control requirement is so re-
strictive that it hinders the achievement of the underlying policy
of facilitating the development of small corporations.'" Accord-
4. The Securities and Exchange Commission has reduced the burdens of securities
regulation on small corporations by exempting offerings by small companies from the full
registration requirements. See e.g., S.E.C. Regulation A, Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R.
§§ 230.25 1-.264 (1981).
5. I.R.C. §§ 351, 368(c).
6. See text accompanying notes 46-55 infra.
7. See notes 22-30 infra and accompanying text.
8. See notes 67-98 infra and accompanying text.
9. Id.
10. See notes 50-59 infra and accompanying text.
11. See notes 99-110 infra and accompanying text.
12. See notes 19-45 infra and accompanying text.
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ingly, this Article urges the abandonment of the percentage con-
trol requirement and its traditional same substance, different form
rationale and, instead, proposes an alternative criterion using cor-
porate net worth to determine which transfers of property merit
favorable tax treatment. 3 This proposed criterion would be less
restrictive than the present control requirement and thus would be
more likely to facilitate the development of small businesses.
I. THE OPERATION OF SECTION 351
Section 35 l(a) provides that no gain or loss shall be recognized
upon the transfer of property to a corporation solely in exchange
for its stock or securities if the transferors of such property control
the corporation immediately thereafter.14 Section 368(c) defines
control as the ownership of at least 80% of the total combined
voting power of all classes of stock of the corporation entitled to
vote and at least 80% of all other classes of stock."' In most cases,
gain not recognized at the time of the exchange will be recognized
later upon the sale or disposition of the stock or securities by the
transferor and upon the sale or disposition of transferred property
by the corporation due to the substituted and carry-over basis pro-
visions applicable to section 351 transactions.' 6 If section 351 op-
erates to suspend immediate recognition of gain or loss, then the
transferor's basis for the stock or securities received in the ex-
change is equal to the basis of the property transferred, subject to
certain possible adjustments.1 7 The transferee corporation takes
13. See notes 111-47 infra and accompanying text.
14. I.R.C. § 35 1(a). If in the exchange the transferor or transferors received from the
controlled corporation cash or other property, referred to as "boot," in addition to stock or
securities, then § 351(b) requires the recognition of any gain realized under § 1001 to the
extent of the boot received. I.R.C. § 351(b).
15. I.R.C. § 368(c). Section 368 applies generally to corporate reorganizations. This
section defines the term "reorganization" in subsections 368(a)(I)(A)-(F). The control re-
quirement of § 368(c) is applicable to the "Type B" reorganization defined in subsection
(a)(1)(B) in which the acquisition of the stock of one corporation is given in exchange
solely for part or all of the voting stock of the acquiring corporation or its parent. In a
Type B reorganization, the acquiring corporation must have "control" of the acquired cor-
poration, as that term is defined in § 368(c), immediately after the acquisition. I.R.C.
§ 368(a)(1)(B). See B. BrrrKER & J. EusTIce, supra note 3, at 14-37 to -48. The control
requirement of § 368(c) also is utilized in a "Type D" reorganization defined in
§ 368(a)(1)(D) which involves the merger of one corporation into a controlled subsidiary
with the stock of its parent used as consideration for the acquisition. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D);
see B. BrrTKER & J. EusTicF, supra note 3, at 14-66 to -71.
16. I.R.C. § 362.
17. I.R.C. § 358. If boot also was received, the transferor's basis in the stock or securi-
ties of the controlled corporation is computed by deducting the boot from the basis of the
property exchanged and adding the amount of gain recognized on the exchange. If the
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the transferor's basis for the property received, again subject to
certain adjustments.' 8
The "controlled corporation" requirement of section 351 de-
mands that the transferors control the corporation immediately af-
ter the exchange.19 Because of high stock ownership requirements
in the definition of control, public corporations with many shares
outstanding and share ownership widely dispersed are unable, in
most cases, to meet the controlled corporation definition.20 In ad-
dition, even small corporations and transferors to such corpora-
tions attempting to use section 351 face substantial uncertainty as
to whether the proposed exchange will result in the required con-
trolled corporation.21
transferee corporation assumed a liability of the transferor or took the property subject to a
liability, the amount of liability constitutes "money received" and reduces the transferors
basis. I.R.C. § 358(d).
18. I.R.C. § 362. The transferee corporation's basis figure is increased by the amount
of gain recognized by the transferor on the exchange. A corporation might argue that § 351
was not applicable to the exchange to obtain a stepped-up basis for the property received in
the exchange. See Portland Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 479 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
310 U.S. 650 (1940).
19. I.R.C. § 35 1(a).
20. A large corporation might attempt to qualify a contribution of property under
§ 351 in the following way: "[Wihat of a transfer of his assets by one comer groceryman
for 0.01 percent of the stock of a newly organized corporation, simultaneously with a trans-
fer by A. & P. of its assets in exchange for 99.99 percent of the stock?" The language of
§ 351 might cover this transaction, "but the cautious tax adviser would surely have some
qualms .... " B. BITTKER & J. EusTIcE, supra note 3, at 3-5. If a corporation were
willing to exchange 80% of its stock for certain property, the transaction likely would be
structured as a "Type A" reorganization under § 368(a) of the Code. In the event both
§ 351 and the reorganization provisions apply to a transaction, it is unclear which provision
would prevail. Id. at 3-73.
Public corporations sometimes have utilized the nonrecognition provisions of § 351 for
the incorporation of a holding company in acquisition transactions where certain minority
shareholders desire tax-free treatment in an otherwise taxable cash purchase of a business.
See Letter Rul. 7839060 (June 28, 1978). Recently, the Service has indicated that it might
reverse its prior approval of this use of § 351 and that, in the future, the applicability of
§ 351 to an incorporation interposed into an acquisitive transaction will depend on whether
the formation of a holding company had sufficient economic substance, independent of the
acquisitive transaction. Rev. Rul. 80-285, 1980-2 C.B. 119. This criteria has been criti-
cized because it ignores the possible existence of a valid business purpose underlying the
formation of the holding company. Rosenberg, Use of Sec. 351 by Minority Shareholder in
,4cquisitions Challenged by New Rulings, 54 J. TAx. 76 (1981). The use of either criteria
would involve further uncertainty in the applicability of the nonrecognition provisions of
§ 351.
21. In 1957, it was observed that the "[rlules governing taxability of incorporation of a
business grow more rigid and specific with each change in the statute and case law." Kahn,
Incorporating the Going Business: How to Find the Method With the Least Tax Cost, 6 J.
TAx. 72 (1957). In a more recent article, the authors noted that "although Section 351 is a
relatively uncomplicated section on the surface, problems can arise." Jefferies & Schellen-
[Vol. 31:814
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The effectiveness of section 351 is hampered by three major
factors. First, it is difficult to determine which transferors to in-
clude in the control group to meet the 80% requirements of section
368(c). Furthermore, it is difficult to determine whether the trans-
fers should be simultaneous or close in time, how economically
interrelated the transfers should be, and whether each transfer
should involve receipt of stock by the transferor.22
Second, the 80% stock ownership requirement is ambiguous.
The Code requires ownership of at least 80% of the total com-
bined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and at
least 80% of all other classes of stock.2 The terms "total com-
bined voting power" and "stock entitled to vote," however, are not
defined. It must be asked, therefore, whether "stock entitled to
vote" includes stock which has only contingent voting rights, con-
ditioned upon the occurrence of certain corporate events, such as
the nonpayment of dividends. 4 Ownership of 80% of the total
number of shares entitled to vote is not necessarily equivalent to
the ownership of 80% of the total combined voting power because
of the existence of shareholder's voting agreements, trusts, or
credit agreements that might divest the shareowner of actual vot-
ing power.21 The Internal Revenue Service (the Service) has fur-
ther complicated the uncertainty surrounding the 80% tests by
berg, Tax considerations when contributingproperly to a business in exchangefor an interest,
1977 TAX. FOR ACCOUNTANTS 298. See text accompanying notes 22-45 infra.
22. In Portland Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 479 (Ist Cir. 1940), the court
stated: "It is also clear that the several transfers need not be effected simultaneously, where
executed in pursuance of an antecedent arrangement." Id. at 488. In another case, trans-
fers separated by four years were combined to satisfy the control requirement of § 351.
Stanley, Inc. v. Schuster, 295 F. Supp. 812 (S.D. Ohio 1969). See also Treas. Reg.
§ 1.351-1(a)(1) (1955).
23. I.R.C. § 368(c).
24. For the purpose of defining "voting power" or "voting stock" under § 302(b)(2),
the Service takes the position that stock which grants the power to vote only on the occur-
rence of a specified event, such as default on the payment of a required dividend, should
not be deemed voting stock until the event occurs. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-3(a) (1955). It is
unclear, however, whether this interpretation would apply to the "entitled to vote" phrase
contained in § 368(c).
25. In interpreting a control test similar to the one contained in § 368(c), the Service
has stated:
A share of stock will generally be considered as possessing the voting power ac-
corded to such share by the corporate charter, bylaws, or share certificate. On the
other hand, if there is any agreement, whether express or implied, that a share-
holder will not vote his stock in a corporation, the formal voting rights possessed
by his stock may be disregarded in determining the percentage of the total com-
bined voting power possessed by the stock owned by other shareholders in the
corporation ....
Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(6) (1965).
19811
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ruling that "80 percent of the total number of shares of all other
classes of stock" means 80% of the total number of each class of
stock. z6 Thus, according to the Service, ownership of 75% of out-
standing Class A preferred nonvoting shares and ownership of
85% of outstanding Class B preferred nonvoting shares would not
satisfy the requirement of ownership of "80 percent of the total
number of shares of all other classes of stock."
The third area of uncertainty is the requirement that control
exist "immediately after the exchange." This requirement has fos-
tered many unanswered questions regarding the definition of "im-
mediately after the exchange." It is difficult to determine, for
instance, how long the requisite control must persist after transfer
to satisfy the "immediate" requirement, 7 whether the transferors
can receive the 80% stock and dispose of some of it shortly there-
after so as to fall below the 80% level,28 and whether it makes a
difference to whom and for what reasons the dispositions were
made.19 Furthermore, there is a question whether the 80% test is
satisfied when, after receipt by the transferors of the requisite
amount of stock, the corporation issues additional stock, thereby
reducing the transferors' proportionate share below the 80%
level.30
In addition to the questions surrounding the control require-
26. Rev. Rul. 59-259, 1959-2 C.B. 115.
27. Subsequent transfers of the stock received in the exchange or the issuance of addi-
tional stock after an exchange may cause loss of control by the transferors, particularly if
transferred or issued pursuant to a "prearranged and integrated plan." See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.351(a)(1) (1955); Rev. Rul. 70-140, 1970-1 C.B. 73; Rev. Rul. 54-96, 1954-1 C.B. 111.
The courts regard the existence of a binding agreement for the subsequent transfer of
the stock received in the exchange or for the issuance of additional shares as determinative.
Compare Intermountain Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 1025 (1976) (binding agree-
ment by incorporator to sell 50% of his stock violated control requirement) with American
Bantam Car v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 397 (1948), aj'dper curiam, 177 F.2d 513 (3d Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 920 (1950) (nonbinding, "informal oral understanding" of
transferors to retransfer stock did not violate control requirement). See also Fahs v. Flor-
ida Mach. & Foundry Co., 168 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1948); Wilgard Realty Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 127 F.2d 514 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 655 (1942).
28. See American Bantam Car Co. v. Commissioner, II T.C. 397 (1948), a dper
curiam 177 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 920 (1950); Rev. Rul. 79-70,
1979-1 C.B. 144.
29. The following distinction has been made with respect to post-transfer transactions
affecting control: "Although the courts have not distinguished between commercial and
noncommercial transactions when deciding whether a loss of control after the exchange is
fatal, much can be said for treating these situations differently." B. BITFKER & J. EusTlc,
supra note 3, at 3-42.
30. In Rev. Rul. 78-492, 1978-2 C.B. 141, the Service expressed its position on two
variations of an incorporation of a sole proprietorship followed by a public offering of
more than 50% of the corporation's stock. The Service ruled that the public offering, pur-
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ment, section 351 may present other obstacles to an existing small
corporation in need of a particular asset. If an appreciated asset
or any asset involving a substantial amount of potential gain is the
subject of the transaction, the owner of the asset may want to dis-
pose of it for stock or securities of the corporation if the nonrecog-
nition provisions of section 351 are applicable.31 In many cases,
the fair market value of the subject asset would not warrant an
exchange for 80% of the corporation's voting stock.32 In such a
situation, control need not be obtained through the exchange in
question. In calculating whether the 80% test has been satisfied,
the transferor may include any and all stock of the corporation,
even stock owned by the transferor prior to the exchange. 33 Thus,
an existing shareholder with relatively large holdings could make
a simultaneous transfer with the owner of the particular asset
needed by the corporation so that the group as a whole would
satisfy the control test.34
The Service has announced, however, that if an existing share-
holder transfers "property which is of relatively small value com-
pared to the value of stock and securities owned ' 35 by the
transferor-shareholder prior to the transfer in question and if the
primary purpose of the transfer is to obtain section 351 entitle-
ment for exchange of property by other transferors, then stock or
securities received by the existing shareholder will not be consid-
ered as having been issued in exchange for property.36 The prop-
erty transferred will not be considered of "relatively small value"
suant to a "firm commitment" or "best efforts" underwriting arrangement, would not vio-
late the control requirement of § 368(c) of the Code.
31. Professor Thompson has observed that "A denial of nonrecognition treatment to
some (or possibly all) members of the organization group could certainly deter the organi-
zation of new business enterprises." Thompson, supra note 3, at 53.
32. If the current shareholders of the corporation consented to the corporation's trans-
fer of 80% or more of its stock to the transferor, those shareholders effectively would be
relinquishing control of the corporation to the transferor. See text accompanying notes
54-57 infra. The subject property of the transfer would have to be of significant value
and/or importance to the corporation for the shareholders to be willing to relinquish their
control.
33. In Rev. RuL 73-473, 1973-2 C.B. 115, the Service stated that no gain or loss was
recognized to any of four transferors of property to their wholly owned corporation in
exchange for securities. Because the four sole shareholders controlled the corporation im-
mediately after the transfer of property, the transaction received nonrecognition treatment
pursuant to § 351.
34. These simultaneous transfers by an existing shareholder often are defined as an
"accommodation" exchange. B. BITTKER & J. EusTicE, supra note 3, at 3-12 n.26.
35. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(a)(1)(ii) (1955). See also Estate of Kamborian v. Commis-
sioner, 469 F.2d 219 (1st Cir. 1972).
36. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(a)(7)(ii) (1955).
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if its fair market value is equal to or in excess of 10% of the stock
and securities already owned by the shareholder-transferor. 3" An
existing shareholder may not possess or be in a position to transfer
an asset of such value which could qualify the exchange of prop-
erty by other transferors under section 351. If the exchange is not
qualified, the proposed transfer of the specified asset will not qual-
ify for nonrecognition treatment and thus may not be effectuated.
The obstacles which the control requirements impose on incor-
poration often may be overcome through simultaneous transfers
by the contributors.38 Even in that situation, however, the control
requirements constrain the financial relationships between the
contributors. According to Service rulings, to be included in the
control group, a transferor must have a proprietary, equity interest
in the corporation after the exchange.3 9 It is sufficient that a trans-
feror of property to a newly formed corporation receive corporate
securities in exchange to qualify the transaction for nonrecogni-
tion; capital stock must be obtained through the exchange.4
Thus, although the financial contributions and positions of the
parties might prescribe a nonequity position for certain contribu-
tors, tax considerations could compel a different result.4'
Another problem in meeting the control requirements at the
time of incorporation is that section 351 prohibits the inclusion in
the control group of a transferor receiving stock or securities in
exchange for services unless the transferor has also received stock
or securities in exchange for property other than services. 42 A per-
37. Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568.
38. See note 22 supra.
39. Rev. Rul. 73-472, 1973-2 C.B. 114; Rev. Rul. 73-473, 1973-2 C.B. 115.
40. If a transferor receives only debt securities in the exchange, the exchange still can
qualify under § 351 if the transferor owns previously acquired stock. Rev. Rul. 73-473,
1973-1 C.B. 115.
41. The nature and amount of the capital contribution by certain transferors might
mandate the issuance of debt by the corporation for those transferors, whereas the contri-
bution of essential services by other transferors might compel an equity position in the
corporation for them. See Herwitz, Allocation of Stock Between Services and Capital in the
Organization ofa Close Corporation, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1098, 1098-99 (1962). For a discus-
sion of the problems under § 351 related to the exchange of stock for services, see text
accompanying notes 42-45 infra.
42. Section 351(a) provides that "stock or securities issued for services shall not be
considered as issued in return for property." I.R.C. § 35 l(a). See James v. Commissioner,
53 T.C. 63 (1969), where the tax court held that because the taxpayer's stock was issued in
exchange for his services, the taxpayer received ordinary income equal to the stock's fair
market value. The court also held that the taxpayer's receipt of the stock for services dis-
qualified him from the control group and left those transferring qualified property without
control as defined by § 368(c). Id. at 69-70. All of the stock received by a transferor, who
transferred both property, as defined in § 351, and services is counted in determining
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son with the "know how" essential to the successful operation of
the corporation often has no property to contribute to the corpora-
tion other than past or future services.43 It has been suggested that
this problem may be avoided if "knowledge" can be classified as
an intangible asset with a fair market value and then transferred
to the corporation for stock. This procedure would allow all of
the stock received by the transferors, whether for services or prop-
erty, to be counted in determining whether the control require-
ments were satisfied.44 Not all services can be classified, however,
as "know how" which would constitute an intangible asset.45
The difficulties and uncertainties surrounding compliance with
the control requirement of section 351 indicate a fundamental in-
consistency between the control requirement and the public policy
favoring small corporations which underlies this nonrecognition
provision. An exploration of the same substance, different form
rationale which supports this control requirement will further
highlight this inconsistency.
II. THE "SAME SUBSTANCE, DIFFERENT FORM" RATIONALE
The requirement of control is cited as the critical element of
section 351 because the transfer of property which results in that
control often changes the form of ownership but not the sub-
stance.46 Through satisfaction of the control requirement, the
transferor retains the incidents of property ownership.47 In one of
the earliest cases to interpret and apply the nonrecognition provi-
sions of section 351,48 the court articulated the same substance,
different form rationale in the following manner:
whether the control requirement has been met. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(c)(1), Example (3)
(1955).
43. See Herwitz, supra note 41.
44. See Ruppert & Pansius, Transfers of Know-How Under Section 351, 55 DEN. L.J.
223 (1978).
45. Id. at 253-79.
46. B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 3, at 3-4. The same substance, different
form rationale was articulated by A.W. Gregg, a special assistant to the Secretary of the
Treasury in a letter to the Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee. The letter
explained certain tax changes proposed by the Secretary of Treasury in the Revenue Act of
1921. In explaining the rationale of the nonrecognition provisions for transfers of property
to certain corporations in exchange for stock, the letter stated that such transactions "con-
stituted a mere change in the form of ownership." Statement ofA. W. Gregg Shows Revi-
sions of 1921 Act Sought by Mellon, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1924, at 8, col. 3.
47. Id.
48. American Compress & Warehouse Co. v. Bender, 70 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1934).
Pertinent portions of this opinion have been cited in other decisions. See Portland Oil Co.
v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 479, 488 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940).
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The statute evidences a recognition that the transaction therein
described effects a change in -form, but not in substance, of the
beneficial interests of the transferors in the transferred prop-
erty. The transaction described in the statute lacks a distin-
guishing characteristic of the sale, in that, instead of the
transaction having the effect of terminating or extinguishing the
beneficial interests of the transferors in the transferred prop-
erty, after the consummation of the transaction the transferors
continue to be beneficially interested in the transferred prop-
erty and have dominion over it by virtue of their control of the
new corporate owner of it. . . . It is apparent that property
owners do not gain or lose by transferring their properties
solely in exchange for all the capital stock of a corporation
brought into existence to take over the property where such
stock is apportioned between the transferors in accordance with
their respective beneficial interests in the transferred
property.
4V
In corporate law, this same substance, different form rationale
is of limited validity. A single transferor exchanging property for
80% of the outstanding voting stock of a corporation most nearly
fulfills this rationale." Even in that situation, however, the trans-
feror may have relinquished substantial control over the trans-
ferred property depending on the debt financing of the
corporation and the rights, pursuant to these debt agreements, of
corporate creditors to corporate assets.5 ' In addition to creditors'
general rights of priority over shareholders in claims on corporate
assets during liquidation or bankruptcy, 52 for example, creditors'
consents may have to be obtained, in accordance with certain loan
covenants, prior to the mortgaging or sale of a corporate asset or
the payment of a corporate dividend.53
The same substance, different form rationale has even less va-
lidity when the transaction involves a group of transferors ex-
changing property for 80% of the voting stock of the corporation.
Most states' corporate codes require, as the requisite vote at share-
holders' meetings, a majority of the outstanding shares present or
represented at the meeting and entitled to vote. 4 The quorum
49. 70 F.2d at 657-58.
50. The holder of 80% of the outstanding stock of a corporation usually has control
over the activities of the corporation. See notes 54-57 infra and accompanying text.
51. H. HENN, LAW OF CoRPoRATioNs 254-55 (2d ed. 1970).
52. Id. at 816-17.
53. To protect debenture holders who usually rank as general creditors, the deben-
tures and/or the indenture contain provisions that limit the corporation's borrowings, divi-
dend payments, and additional issuance of its stock and require the maintenance of a
special ratio of current assets to current liabilities. Id. at 283-84.
54. Id. at 374.
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requirement for shareholders' meetings is usually a majority of the
shares outstanding and entitled to vote at the meeting 5 A major-
ity of the outstanding shares entitled to vote, therefore, satisfies
the minimum requisite vote. In most small corporations, however,
all shares outstanding and entitled to vote often are present or rep-
resented by a proxy at the shareholders' meeting, particularly if
there is dissension among shareholders. Thus, in a small corpora-
tion, only the ownership of a majority of the outstanding shares
would assure a shareholder control over the corporation.56 Since
many states require or permit the corporation's articles of incorpo-
ration to mandate even greater voting requirements, such as two-
thirds of the outstanding shares, a majority of shareholders may
be able to exercise only limited control over the management or
disposition of corporate assets.57
A member of the transfer group qualifying for the control test
who receives less than a majority of the outstanding shares enti-
tled to vote usually has relinquished effective control over the
transferred property. Actual control over the use and disposition
of corporate property rests with the holder or holders of the ma-
jority of the outstanding shares entitled to vote. The minority
shareholder in a small corporation may reverse this relative
powerlessness by creating a voting agreement or voting trust with
other shareholders to combine their voting power and obtain the
equivalent of majority control.58 Voting agreements and trusts,
however, are used infrequently and often vest the actual power to
vote the shares in a non-shareholder third party trustee.59
The same substance, different form rationale is analogous to
the "continuity of interest" rationale supporting the nonrecogni-
tion provisions for reorganizations-a doctrine which also has
been criticized by scholars.60 Originally, the nonrecognition pro-
55. Id, N. LATrIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATxOrs 361 (2d ed. 1971).
56. See notes 54-55 supra and accompanying text.
57. A majority shareholder may lack the requisite voting power to compel the disposi-
tion of corporate assets and may discover that the terms of the corporation's loan agree-
ments require the approval of certain creditors for the sale of all or substantially all of the
corporate assets or any merger or consolidation of the corporation. See note 53 supra.
58. H. HENN, supra note 51, at 389-95.
59. Id. at-3914-3.
60. B. BITrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 3, at 14-17 to -18. See also Ruppert, Pro-
posed Treasury Regulation Section 1.368-1(d): The Continuity of Business Enterprise Test,
29 DE PAUL L. REv. 723 (1980); Note, Boot Distributions in Corporate Reorganizations:
DividendEquivalenceandthe Continuity of Interest Doctrine, 32 U. FLA. L. REV. 119 (1979).
The Internal Revenue Service has recently amended Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) and has ad-
ded Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d) to provide that to satisfy the continuity of enterprise test, the
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visions for both reorganizations and transfers of property to cor-
porations were contained in section 202 of the Code.6 The
Service has explained the rationale for these nonrecognition pro-
visions for reorganizations in the following manner:
The purpose of the reorganization provisions of the Code is to
except from the general rule [of recognition of gain or loss from
the exchange of property] certain specifically described ex-
changes incident to such readjustments of corporate structures
made in one of the particular ways specified in the Code, as are
required by business exigencies and which effect only a read-
justment of continuing interest in property under modified cor-
porate forms.62
The continuity of interest doctrine has a multifaceted character
depending on whether it is applied at the corporate or shareholder
level.63 The doctrine and its application have been criticized
roundly.6' Recently, Professor Wolfman observed that the devel-
opment of the doctrine has resulted in the "application of arbi-
trary, complex, if not Byzantine, rules that give lip service to a
continuity doctrine that emerged in the early 1930's almost acci-
dentally and has grown monstrously and mindlessly for close to
50 years. '65
The limited validity of the same substance, different form ra-
tionale and the problems surrounding application of the control
requirements of section 351 described above, raise the possibility
that the section's "practical nature is cloaked with a theoretical
doctrine. ' 66 The legislative history of section 351 provides some
guidance as to the "practical concerns" which prompted Congress
to enact the predecessor of section 351.
acquiring corporation must continue the historic business of the acquired corporation or
use a significant portion of the acquired corporation's historic business assets in a continu-
ing business. [1981] 3 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 2550.
61. Act of Feb. 24, 1919, ch. 18, § 202, 40 Stat. 1058. For the history of this section,
see notes 67-85 infra and accompanying text.
62. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1955).
63. B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 3, at 14-17 to -18.
64. Hellerstein, Mergers, Taxes, and Realism, 71 HARV. L. REV. 254 (1957); Jacobs,
Reorganizing the Reorganization Provisions, 35 TAX L. REV. 415 (1980); Sandberg, The In-
come Tax Subsidy to "Reorganizations," 38 COLUM. L. REV. 98 (1938); Wolfman, "Con-
tinuity of Interest" and The American Law Institute Study, 57 TAXES 840 (1979). But see
Dane, The Casefor Nonrecognition of Gain in Reorganization Exchanges, 36 TAXES 244
(1958).
65. Wolrman, supra note 64, at 840.
66. Professor Surrey made the charge that the concept of realization masks practical
concerns with theoretical doctrine. Surrey, The Supreme Court and the Federal Income
Tax: Some Implications of the Recent Decisions, 35 ILL. L. REV. 779, 787 (1941).
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III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 351
The first proposal regarding nonrecognition for transfers of
property to corporations in exchange for corporate stock or securi-
ties was contained in a revenue bill submitted to the full Senate by
the Senate Committee on Finance on December 6, 1918.67 The
Senate Report's introduction to the proposed bill stated that the
bill differed substantially from another bill submitted several
months earlier by the House Committee on Ways and Means be-
cause of two intervening events-the cessation of World War I
and the enactment of legislation prohibiting the sale of alcoholic
beverages.6" The Senate Report explained the financial and tax
effect of the cessation of World War I in this manner:
Taxes which can be easily borne amid the feverish activity and
patriotic fever of war times, are neither so welcome nor so eas-
ily sustained amid the uncertainties, the depreciating inven-
tories, and the falling markets which are apt to mark the
approach of peace. Repressive taxes which in time of war are
justified for the very reason that they diminish the demand for
labor, capital, and raw material, are for the very same reason
obnoxious and undesirable in times of peace. The cessation of
war, therefore, brought with it not only the opportunity but the
necessity of reducing the large tax budget which the House had
voted.6
The Senate bill terminated the war-profits tax and greatly re-
duced excess profit taxes. The Senate Report explained that these
tax reductions were prudent "[diuring this period of reconstruc-
tion" as a stimulant for business, "particularly new business." 70
The bill included a provision, section 202(b), which established
the rule for "determining taxable gains" derived from the ex-
changes of property. Section 202(b) required that the fair market
value of property received be treated as the amount realized.7'
The original version of section 202(b), however, as proposed by
the Senate, provided for the nonrecognition of gain or loss in two
types of exchanges: First, when, in connection with the reorgani-
zation or consolidation of a corporation, a person receives new
stock or securities of no greater aggregate par value than the stock
or securities exchanged; and second, "when a person receives in
place of property stock of a corporation formed to take over such
67. S. REP. No. 617, Pt. 1, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 1, 5-6 (1918).
68. Id. at 1.
69. Id. at 2.
70. Id. at 3.
71. Id. at 5.
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property."72 The latter exception would appear to provide non-
recognition of gain or loss primarily on any transfer of property to
a newly formed corporation. According to the Senate Report, the
purpose of these nonrecognition provisions was "to negative the
assertion of tax in the case of certain purely paper transactions. 73
In Senate floor debate on the bill, these provisions were referred to
as a "cushion to ease off the taxes."'74 In the bill enacted by Con-
gress, however, the nonrecognition provision for transfers of prop-
erty to certain corporations was deleted without any recorded
explanation, but the nonrecognition provision for reorganizations
and consolidations was retained, without definition of those
terms.75
In 1921, the nonrecognition provisions of section 202 were
substantially revised and the predecessor of section 351 was en-
acted.76 The revised section 202 provided that gain or loss should
be recognized upon exchange of property if the property received
in the exchange had a "readily realizable market value." Further-
more, the section specifically provided for nonrecognition in enu-
merated situations even if the property received in the exchange
had a readily realizable market value.7 7 The enumerated situa-
tions included the receipt of stock or securities in exchange for
stock or securities in a reorganization and the receipt of stock or
securities in exchange for property transferred to a corporation
when the transferor was in control of the corporation after receipt
of the stock.78 The 1921 Revenue Act deleted the 1918 Revenue
Act par value restrictions on stock received in a reorganization
and defined reorganization to include a merger, consolidation, re-
capitalization, the mere change in identity, form, or place of a cor-
poration's organization, the acquisition by one corporation of at
least a majority of the voting stock and at least a majority of the
72. Id. at 5-6.
73. Id. at 5.
74. S. REP. No. 617, Pt. 5, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 3 (1918). The minority report de-
scribed these nonrecognition provisions:
They have been called "relief provisions" or "cushion provisions."
They should be called "trap-door provisions," as they will prove a ready and
convenient exit for disappearing revenues and serve to facilitate the escape of the
corporations from just taxation.
They found favor with the committee in a desire to afford relief to a limited
number of corporations which appeared to suffer hardship in the application of
the general rule ....
75. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057.
76. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202(c)(3), 42 Stat. 227.
77. Id. § 202(c).
78. Id. § 202(c)(2)-(3).
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total number of shares of all other classes of stock of another cor-
poration, and the acquisition by one corporation of substantially
all the assets of another corporation.7 9 The term "control" was
defined as ownership of at least 80% of the voting stock and at
least 80% of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock
of a corporation. This definition is similar to the definition found
today in section 368(a).10
In addition to the same substance, different form rationale,
concern for the taxpayer's liquidity also has served as a rationale
for nonrecognition provisions for both corporate reorganizations
and transfers of property to a corporation. The nonrecognition
provision in revised section 202 for exchanges, where the property
received had no "readily realizable market value," could be inter-
preted to be substantial evidence of a congressional concern with
the liquidity of the asset received by the taxpayer and the fear that
requiring payment of tax on a "paper" transaction might create
undue financial hardship for the taxpayer.8" Liquidity, however,
generally has not been a determinative factor in the concept of
realization in other areas of tax law.12 Moreover, it is equally
plausible that this nonrecognition provision was motivated by a
desire to prevent the recognition of loss, particularly in cases
where the property received is the stock of a small corporation,
with restrictions on the resale of the stock that would reduce its
market value and/or make valuation of the stock difficult to ascer-
tain.83 In the Revenue Bill of 1924, the exception for property
received in an exchange which has no "readily realizable market
value" was deleted because of the great difficulty in interpreting
the provision and the uncertainty it created. The other nonrecog-
nition provisions, however, were retained. 84 Indeed, if the pri-
79. Id. § 202(c)(3).
80. I.R.C. § 368(a).
81. In Portland Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 479 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S.
650 (1940), the court stated that in exchanges qualifying for § 351 nonrecognition, "the
taxpayer has not really 'cashed in' on the theoretical gain, or closed out a losing venture."
Id. at 488.
82. M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 69-71 (2d ed. 1979). See generally
Roehner & Roehner, Realization: Administrative Convenience or Constitutional Require-
ment, 8 TAX L. REV. 173 (1953); Surrey, supra note 66.
83. In explaining the revisions to § 202 proposed by the Revenue Bill of 1921, the
Senate Report stated that the revision relating to transfers of property would "considerably
increase the revenue by preventing taxpayers from taking colorable losses in wash sales and
other fictitious exchanges." S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1921).
84. S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1924). The Report gave the follow-
ing reasons for deletion of the exception:
Great difficulty has been experienced in administering this provision. The ques-
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mary concern had been the taxpayer's liquidity, an easy measure
of that liquidity would have been whether the stock received by
the taxpayer in the exchange or reorganization was traded in the
over-the-counter market or on a securities exchange.85
The provision for nonrecognition on transfers of property to a
controlled corporation was a departure from the general rule of
taxability of property exchanges-a rule which persists today with
limited exceptions.8 6 Both the House and Senate Reports recom-
mending passage of these revisions to section 202 justified the ex-
ceptions to the general rule as being necessary to facilitate
"business readjustments" and prevent the recognition of colorable
losses.8 7 Both the Senate and House Reports contained almost
identical statements that the revisions would "by removing a
source of grave uncertainty, not only permit business to go for-
ward with the readjustments required by existing conditions but
[would] also considerably increase the revenue by preventing tax-
payers from taking colorable losses in wash sales and other ficti-
tious exchanges. 8 8 Neither report defined the necessary business
readjustments or discussed the rationale for the 80% control re-
quirement. 89 The floor discussion of the bill's provisions focused
on the mechanical operations of the proposed revisions to the re-
organization provisions.90
The legislative history of the Revenue Acts of 1918 and 1921
shows that the predominant congressional concern in enacting the
nonrecognition provisions for both reorganizations and certain
tion whether, in a given case, the property received in exchange has a readily
realizable market value is a most difficult one, and the rulings on this question in
given cases have been far from satisfactory .... It appears best to provide gen-
erally that gain or loss is recognized from all exchanges and then except specifi-
cally and in definite terms those cases of exchanges in which it is not desired to
tax the gain or allow the loss. This results in definiteness and accuracy and en-
ables a taxpayer to determine prior to the consummation of a given transaction
the tax liability that will result therefrom.
Id.
85. For a discussion of a proposal using the noamarketability of the stock and securi-
ties received as the criteria for nonrecognition of gains realized in connection with a
merger, see Hellerstein, supra note 64, at 281-85.
86. B. BITrKER & J. EusTicE, supra note 3, at 14-3 to -6.
87. S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1921); H.RI REP. No. 350, 67th
Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1921).
88. H. R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1921). See note 83 supra.
89. The control requirement could have been a compromise of nonrecognition treat-
ment of property transfers to corporations. See Thompson, supra note 3, at 44. Addition-
ally, the control requirement could have been designed to limit nonrecognition treatment
to small or closely held corporations. See text accompanying notes 93-98 infra.
90. 61 CONG. REC. 5123-5376 (1921).
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transfers of property to corporations was the need to stimulate the
economy after World War I by both removing any tax disincen-
tives and providing tax incentives for a variety of corporate activi-
ties, including corporate combinations and the incorporation of
ongoing or new businesses. This increased flexibility for corporate
activities provided by the federal tax law had its analogy in con-
temporaneous developments in the state corporate law area. In
describing the increased emphasis on utility during the early
1900's as the legitimating factor for corporate law, Professor Hurst
observed:
The movement of policy from the 1890's into the 1930's carried
the utilitarian attitude about as far as it could go: if the law of
corporate organization was legitimated by its utility to business
enterprise, legitimacy would be most fully achieved if the law
empowered businessmen to create whatever arrangements they
found most serviceable. The new style of corporation statutes
in effect judged that corporate status had no social relevance
save as a device legitimized by its utility to promote business.
The obverse of this judgment was that regulation of business
activity was no longer to be deemed a proper function of the
law of corporate organization. The function of corporation law
was to enable businessmen to act, not to police their ac-
tion. .... In substance through the new pattern of corporation
acts prevailing opinion accepted the proposition that the legiti-
macy of corporation law lay simply in serving vigorous promo-
tional will in developing and consolidating business
enterprise.91
In an unsuccessful congressional attempt in 1934 to abolish the
nonrecognition provisions for reorganizations and transfers of
property to certain corporations, it was acknowledged that these
provisions originally were enacted to prevent taxation from "seri-
ously interfering with business." 92
The concepts of continuity of interest and controlled corpora-
tions may have been convenient theories to rationalize the policy
goals of the nonrecognition provisions. Definitional differences
between these two concepts, however, reveal distinct approaches
and effects. The 80% control requirement applicable to transfers
of property to a corporation, for example, usually prevents public
corporations with a large number of shares and shareholders from
using the provision.93 The control definition thus limits the appli-
91. J. HuisT, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 1780-1970, at 70-71 (1970) (footnotes omitted).
92. H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1933).
93. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
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cability of section 351 primarily to closely held corporations with
few outstanding shares and few shareholders.9 4 As a result, sec-
tion 351 potentially encourages the development of small busi-
nesses 95 by removing most of the tax disincentives to
incorporating a going concern or a new business and providing
favorable tax treatment for certain transfers of property to
corporations.
In contrast, the nonrecognition provisions for corporate reor-
ganizations are more readily available to both publicly and closely
held corporations.96 In view of the rejection of the 1918 proposal
for nonrecognition on transfers of property to any newly formed
corporation and the enactment, in 1921, of a nonrecognition pro-
vision for property transfers only to controlled corporations, it is
possible that the 80% control requirement was selected, in part, as
a means of restricting favorable tax treatment to small corpora-
tions.97 The absence of any control requirements in the analogous
nonrecognition provision for transfers of property to a partnership
in exchange for a partnership interest possibly may be explained
by the absence of any publicly held partnerships.9" Thus, the non-
recognition provision for property contributions to partnerships
also may have been intended to apply only to small business
enterprises.
IV. PUBLIC POLICY PROMOTING SMALL BUSINESSES
The promotion of small businesses has been a dominant theme
in the economic legislation enacted during the twentieth century.
The Small Business Act of 1953, for example, sought to preserve
and expand the free enterprise system through the development of
small businesses. 99 Section 631(a) of the Act states:
It is the declared policy of the Congress that the Government
should aid, counsel, assist, and protect, insofar as is possible,
94. See notes 20-21 supra and accompanying text.
95. See notes 14-22 supra and accompanying text. This promotion of small busi-
nesses is consistent with other federal tax provisions favoring small corporations. See notes
101-06 infra and accompanying text.
96. Many of the reorganization provisions do not contain the 80% control requirement
or any analogous requirement. See note 15 supra.
97. See note 89 supra.
98. Section 721 simply provides: "No gain or loss shall be recognized to a partnership
or to any of its partners in the case of a contribution of property to the partnership in
exchange for an interest in the partnership." I.R.C. § 721. This difference in tax treatment
of transfers of property to a partnership and a corporation has been criticized as having no
sound basis in tax policy. See Thompson, supra note 3, at 39-42.
99. Small Business Act of 1953, 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-650 (1976).
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the interest of small-business concerns in order to preserve free
competitive enterprise, to insure that a fair proportion of the
total purchases and contracts or subcontracts for the Govern-
ment... be placed with small-business enterprises, to insure
that a fair proportion of the total sales of Government property
be made to such enterprises, and to maintain and strengthen
the over-all economy of the Nation.'00
In addition, the promotion of small businesses has been a re-
current theme in federal tax law. The enactment of Subchapter
S10 1 of the Code in 1958, treating, with certain limitations, some
closely held corporations as partnerships for tax purposes, was
designed to allow businesses to select their legal forms absent un-
due tax influence, to aid small businesses by taxing the corpora-
tion's income to shareholders who were in lower brackets than
their corporations, and to permit the shareholders of corporations
suffering losses to offset such losses against individual income
from other sources."0 2 A further indication of the congressional
intent to aid small businesses is found in section 1244-a 1958
provision allowing certain favorable tax treatment to shareholders
of small corporations. 10 3 The purpose of this section was to "en-
courage the flow of new funds into small business" and to position
shareholders of small corporations "on a more nearly equal basis
with. .. proprietors and partners."'" The Revenue Act of 1978
also cut corporate tax rates10 5 specifically to encourage the growth
of small businesses by providing relatively greater tax relief to
these small corporations than large ones.'0 6
Concern for the development of small businesses has not
waned in recent years. In fact, such concern has shaped the im-
pact of securities regulation on the activities of small businesses.
The Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980 states, as
one of its purposes, "a substantial reduction in costs and
paperwork to diminish the burdens of raising investment capital
(particularly by small business) . ,,*" 107 In its report on the Act,
the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce stated
100. Id. § 631(a).
101. .LR.C. §§ 1371-1379.
102. B. BrrrnER & J. EusTicE, supra note 3, at 6-2.
103. I.R.C. § 1244 (individual shareholders may treat losses on small business stock as
ordinary losses).
104. H.R. REP. No. 2198, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), reprintedin 1959-2 C.B. 709,711.
105. I.R.C. § 11.
106. Thompson, supra note 3, at 6.
107. Small Business Investment Incentive Act, Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 505, 94 Stat. 2275
15 U.S.C. § 77s(c) (Supp. III 1979).
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that it was "well aware of the slowing of the flow of capital to
American enterprise, particularly to smaller, growing businesses,
that has occurred in recent years.' 0 8
The Securities and Exchange Commission also has recognized
the potential for securities regulations to have the "effect of inad-
vertently impairing capital formation by small businesses."' 9 Re-
cently, the Securities and Exchange Commission adopted
measures to ease the burden of regulation on small businesses to
enable such companies to raise needed capital."t 0
In light of the established public policy to promote and foster
the development of small businesses, it is logical to structure and
apply section 351 in a manner more compatible with this goal.
The present application of this nonrecognition provision impedes,
rather than facilitates, its use by small corportions. The contin-
ued existence of the current version of section 351 directly contra-
venes the declared congressional purpose behind that provision.
V. CONDITIONING NONRECOGNITION TREATMENT ON
CORPORATE NET WORTH
The present control requirement in section 351, as interpreted
by the Service and the courts, contradicts the underlying congres-
sional concern to promote small businesses,' l because it is so bur-
densome on small corporations.' 2 For this reason, the present
control requirement test, which determines an entity's eligibility
for nonrecognition treatment on its transfer of property to a cor-
poration in exchange for stock, should be abandoned. Further-
more, statutory revision must supplement any changes in
administrative or judicial interpretation of the control
requirement.
The best test for eligibility is simply whether the corporation
receiving property in exchange for its stock is a small corporation.
This test would promote small corporations-the primary motiva-
tion behind the legislative enactment of section 351's predeces-
sor." 3 Moreover, such a test would reflect legislative concern with
108. H.R. REP. No. 1341, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1980).
109. U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION & U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMIN-
ISTRATION, Q&A: SMALL BUSINESS AND THE S.E.C. 2 (1980).
110. Id. at 5-12.
111. See notes 93-98 supra and accompanying text.
112. See notes 22-45 supra and accompanying text.
113. See text accompanying notes 84-90 supra.
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the financial viability of small businesses and reduce governmen-
tal regulation of such businesses.
Unlike the ambiguous and complicated terms of the present
control requirement, the term "small corporation" has been used
precisely in an established body of case law and administrative
interpretations. For small corporations, often unable to afford ex-
tensive legal consultation, such a precise definition would be more
advantageous than trying to resolve the complexities of the 80%
control requirement." 4
Of the areas of case law from which to choose, state corporate
law, however, cannot adequately define a small corporation. Al-
though many states have attempted to provide different corporate
code provisions for small or closely held corporations, no com-
monly accepted definition of a small corporation has emerged."-
In 1958, it was observed that "[tihe term 'close corporation' or
'closely held corporation' has no clearly defined meaning in the
law of the various American jurisdictions."' 6 More recently, in
1975, it was stated that "the term 'close corporation,' like 'obscen-
ity,' seems incapable of precise definition."" 7 Likewise, Professor
O'Neal, in his treatise on close corporations, noted that "[t]he term
'close corporation' has been defined in various ways." '" 8 Another
authority on the taxation of closely held corporations concluded,
after consideration of the variations in state corporate law, that
"[n]o all-inclusive and all-exclusive definition of a closely held
corporation is possible.""' 9
There are, however, two definitions of a small corporation
which are available in areas of federal tax law outside section 351.
First, section 1371(a), relating to Subchapter S corporations, de-
114. See notes 22-45 supra and accompanying text.
115. The use of the term "close corporation" has been criticized as "inaccurate because
a 'close corporation' is not necessarily a small enterprise nor even one having compara-
tively few stockholders. . . ." Israels, The Close Corporation and the Law, 33 CORNELL
L.Q. 488 (1948). See notes 116-19 infra and accompanying text.
116. Scott, The Close Corporation in Contemporary Business, 13 Bus. LAW. 741, 741
(1958).
117. Ginsberg, The Need for Special Close Corporation Legislation in Illinois, 25 DE
PAUL L. REv. 1, 10 (1975).
118. F. O'NE., CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.02 (1971).
119. T. NEss & E. VOGEL, TAXATION OF THE CLOSELY HELD CORPORATION 1-5 (3d
ed. 1976).
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fines a "small business corporation." 121 Only such defined small
business corporations can use the provisions of Subchapter S,
which generally permit such corporations to be taxed as though
they were conducting their activities as partnerships.' 2 ' The defi-
nition of a small business corporation includes a domestic corpo-
ration with only one class of stock outstanding and no more than
25 shareholders, all of which are individuals, estates, trusts, and
United States residents. 122 This definition is narrow to avoid the
administrative complexities and large costs to the Treasury which
arise from a large number of shareholders and to prevent abuse of
the loss pass-through provisions is available to Subchapter S cor-
porations. 123 By contrast, section 351's nonelective nonrecogni-
tion provisions, though generally advantageous to shareholders,
often can harm the affected shareholder by prohibiting the recog-
nition of losses. Although limiting small corporations to such a
small number of shareholders restricts the special tax treatment of
Subchapter S provisions to closely held corporations, it also ex-
cludes corporations with a large number of shareholders which
are recognized as closely held corporations. 24
Secondly, in another context, the Code defines a small busi-
ness corporation without reference to the number of shareholders.
Section 1244 permits shareholders of a small business corporation
to deduct from ordinary income a loss on the stock of the corpora-
tion, subject to certain limitations. 25 A small business corpora-
tion is defined generally in section 1244 as a corporation with
capital of one million dollars or less, reduced by the amount of
any liability assumed or to which the corporation's property is
subject. 26 This definitional requirement must be met when the
120. "[S]mall business corporation means a domestic corporation which is not a
member of an affiliate group. . . and which does not-
(1) have more than 25 shareholders;
(2) have as a shareholder a person (other than an estate and other than a
trust. . .) who is not an individual;
(3) have a nonresident alien as a shareholder, and
(4) have more than one class of stock.
I.R.C. § 1371(a). See B. BITrKER & J. EusTicE, supra note 3, at 6-1 to -42.
121. I.R.C. § 1372(b).
122. Id. § 1371(a).
123. Id. § 1374. The provision allowing the corporation's net operating losses to be
passed through to the shareholders is particularly advantageous. Id. § 1374(a).
124. T. NEss & E. VOGEL, supra note 119, at 1-4. "Prior to 1955, the huge Ford Motor
Company was, under almost any definition, a closely held corporation." Id. at 1-3 n.9
(rev. ed. 1972).
125. I.R.C. § 1244(a). See B. BITrKER & J. EUSTicE, supra note 3, at 4-43 to -49.
126. I.R.C. § 1244(c)(3).
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stock, on which the loss is claimed, is issued. In addition, the cor-
poration must meet certain requirements restricting the amount of
passive income when the loss is sustained. 127 This restriction gen-
erally prevents a shareholder from obtaining a deduction from or-
dinary income pursuant to section 1244 if the corporation's
primary activity is investment which, if made by a shareholder in
his or her individual capacity, constitutes a capital loss. 128 Thus,
the restrictions on passive income are inappropriate for the pur-
poses of a section 351 definition of a small corporation since sec-
tion 351 does not provide favorable tax treatment for a loss on a
corporation's stock. 129
These two definitions of a small corporation have an analogue
in the definition of a corporation subject to the registration re-
quirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934
Act). 130 Section 12(g) of the 1934 Act requires a corporation to
register its equity securities if its total assets exceed one million
dollars and a class of equity securities is held by 500 or more own-
ers of record.' 3' Corporations meeting these criteria are often re-
ferred to as public corporations, as opposed to nonpublic or
private corporations. 32  Registration of a public corporation's eq-
uity securities is required even though the corporation has never
sold its securities pursuant to a registered public offering, the se-
curities are not traded in the over-the-counter market, and the se-
curities are not listed on a securities exchange. 33  Once the
securities are registered, the corporation is subject to the 1934
Act's periodic reporting requirements 34 and its proxy and tender
127. Id. § 1244(c)(1)(C). Passive income is that income derived from "royalties, rents,
dividends, interests, annuities, and sales or exchanges of stocks or securities." Id.
128. B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 3, at 4-47.
129. Section 351 prohibits the recognition of loss. I.R.C. § 351(b)(2).
130. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(g), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1976). See generally 3
H. BLOOMENTRHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORsPORATE LAW § 3.03 (1972).
131. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(g), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1976).
132. 5 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3120 (2d ed. Supp. 1969). See W. KLEIN,
BUsINESs ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 93-94 (1980); T. NESS & E. VOGEL, supra note
119, at 1-2 n.2.
133. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(g), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1976).
134. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(b), 15 US.C.§ 78m(b) (1976). The principal
reports required by this section include yearly and quarterly reports as well as monthly
reports upon the occurrence of certain material events. Registration under the 1934 Act
also subjects the company's officers, directors, and certain shareholders to the short-swing
provisions of § 16(b). This section requires specified insiders to return to the company any
profits derived from a purchase and sale or sale and purchase of the company's securities
made within a six month period. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1976).
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offer regulations. 135 As applied to small corporations, the benefits
of these requirements were deemed outweighed by the costs, and
thus, section 12(g)'s definitional provisions were specifically
designed to exclude small corporations.1 36  Thus, the securities
laws, in effect, define a small corporation as one which does not
meet section 12(g)'s capital and shareholder number
requirements. 37
The 1934 Act's restriction on the number of shareholders as a
criterion for a public corporation is related to the primary purpose
of the securities laws-the protection of investors through various
disclosure requirements. 38 In circumstances of large numbers of
shareholders, and the attendant atomization of ownership, an-
tifraud protection may require supplementation by itemized dis-
135. Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976), makes it unlawful to
solicit proxies in violation of the Securities and Exchange Commission rules and regula-
tions. The commission has adopted extensive regulations controlling proxy solicitations.
17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to .14a-12 (1976). Tender offers are also subject to Securities and
Exchange Commission regulations. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d
(1976).
136. 5 L. Loss, supra note 132, at 2712-13, 3117-20.
137. The Securities and Exchange Commission recently has proposed definitions of the
terms "small business" and "small organization" for purposes of the Regulatory Flexibility
Act which requires the commission to evaluate its regulations, to weigh their impact on
small business entities and to consider alternative requirements if there is a "significant
economic impact" on such entities. Pub. L. No. 96-354, § 603(c), 94 Stat. 1164 (1980). See
SEC Securities Act Release No. 6302, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1
82,857 (March 20, 1981). Under the 1934 Act, the proposed definition of "small business"
and "small organization" would include any "person" whose total assets on the last date of
its most recent fiscal year were $2.5 million or less. Id. Different definitions of "small
business" and "small organization" are proposed for the various securities statutes. The
proposed rules, for example, would classify, for purposes of the Investment Company Act
of 1940 and the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, an investment company as "small" if it
had net assets of $50 million or less as of the end of its most recent fiscal year. Id. Other
definitions are proposed for the Securities Act of 1933, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939,
and the Holding Company Act of 1935. None of these proposed definitions contain a crite-
rion based on the number of shareholders; the proposed definitions' determinative factors
relate either to total assets or revenues. The commission explained the absence of a crite-
rion relating to the number of shareholders in the following way:
Supporters of the number of shareholders as a criterion felt that it demonstrated
investor interest in a company and thus was determinative of the need for contin-
uing disclosure. With respect to assessing compliance burdens, however, several
commentators stated that assets represent a simple and functional criterion for
meauring an issuer's size in relation to the cost of complying with secutities regu-
lation. Thus, it would appear that an asset test would be the most appropriate
indicator of a "small business" or "small organization" for purposes of identify-
ing those companies for which a proposed or adopted rule under the reporting or
disclosure provisions of the Securities Exchange Act may have a disproportionate
compliance burden.
Id.
138. Id. at 3119.
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closure provisions. 3 9  As with the shareholder limitation
contained in the Subchapter S definition of a small business cor-
poration, the shareholder criterion in the public corporation defi-
nition serves a purpose unrelated to the concerns of section 35 1. 1
There would be a disadvantage to including a shareholder lim-
itation in the definition of a small corporation for the purposes of
section 351. The commonly accepted notion of a closely held cor-
poration includes a corporation with a relatively large number of
shareholders. 4' A corporation in which 20% of the stock, for ex-
ample, is held by a large number of persons but in which a con-
trolling block of stock is held by a few persons is generally
regarded as a small or closely held corporation. 4 2 This pattern of
share ownership may be achieved in a corporation controlled by a
few persons, such as family members, which has encouraged,
through various fringe benefit plans, purchases of the corpora-
tion's stock by the corporation's employees. 43  Such stock
purchase plans for corporate employees have been encouraged in
other areas of tax law.'" A shareholder limitation in the defini-
tional provisions of section 351 might penalize corporations that
139. Id. at 3118-19.
140. See notes 123-24 supra and accompanying text.
141. T. NEss & E. VOGEL, supra note 119, at 1-2 to -3.
142. Id.
143. In such a situation, public trading in the stock may not have developed. Ginsberg,
supra note 117, at 14-15 & n.58.
144. Since the Revenue Act of 1921, "qualified" deferred compensation plans, includ-
ing certain stock bonus plans, profit-sharing and thrift-and-savings plans, have been given
special federal tax treatment. In general, such "qualified" plans allow: (I) the employer to
take a current deduction for contributions, while employees defer taxation on the contribu-
tions until benefits are paid; (2) the plan to realize, without taxation, income and gains
from its investment; and (3) its participants potential eligibility for special income and
estate tax treatment on their distributions. A stock bonus plan, for example, allows annual
employer contributions of 15% or less of the aggregate compensation of all participants.
Distributions from the plans are in the employer's stock. Profit-sharing plans and thrift
plans can also be used as vehicles for the acquisition by employees of their employers'
stock. In addition, there are a number of special plans for selected employees with varying
degrees of favorable tax treatment: stock option plans, performance-share plans, phantom-
stock plans and restricted-stock plans. A more broadly based employee stock option plan,
an employee stock purchase plan under § 423, permits purchase of the employer's stock at
a discount of as much as 15% of the current market price. Bachelder & Siegal, Comparison
of ESOPWhh Other Types of Employee Stock Ownersbhp Arrangementf, in EMPLOYEE
STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS 573-7 1 (3. Bachelder ed. 1979). A qualified employee stock
ownership plan under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-3381 (1976), permits an employee to borrow from or on the credit of the employer
to purchase securities of the employer. EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS, SUpra, at 4.
Moreover, employee stock ownership plans which qualify as Tax Reduction Act Employee
Stock Plans permit contributing employers to elect to take up to an additional 1.5% invest-
ment tax credit. See McSweeny, Changes Made by the Temporary and Final TPA SOP Reg-
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have participated in those plans by making section 351 inapplica-
ble, or the limitation might discourage such participation. 145
Concern with the financial viability of small businesses man-
dates a definition that focuses on a corporation's net worth rather
than on the number of shareholders. If Congress were to rewrite
section 351 to substitute for the control test section 1244,S146 one
million dollar net worth definition of a small business, then the
problems of interpreting the test for section 351 applicability
would be reduced and the uniformity of the tax provisions would
be enhanced.147
VI. CONCLUSION
Over sixty years ago, Congress adopted a requirement of cor-
porate control for shareholders to obtain nonrecognition of any
gains incurred in the exchange of property for a corporation's
stock. The control requirement was adopted somewhat arbitrarily
as a way to restrict the favorable nonrecognition tax treatment for
property transfers to small corporations. This control requirement
has been rationalized by a same substance, different form theory,
which may have been a convenient way to justify the practical
congressional concern motivating the favorable tax treat-
ment-the promotion of small corporations.
The control requirement, however, which currently is imposed
under sections 351 and 368(c), is unduly restrictive and presents
substantial obstacles to small corporations and potential transfer-
ors of property to such corporations attempting to qualify for sec-
tion 351's nonrecognition treatment. The control requirement
should be replaced with a simple provision making section 351's
nonrecognition provisions applicable to small corporations
through the use of section 1244's net worth definition of small cor-
porations. This simplification of section 351's provisions would
facilitate the acquisition of assets by small corporations-a goal of
continuing importance in American public policy.
ulations, in EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS, supra, at 529-52; Rhodes, Investment
Tax Credit ESOP (TRASOPs), in EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS, supra at 481-528.
145. If a corporation participating in an employee stock purchase plan has a large
number of employees, the corporation may be viewed as having a large number of share-
holders even though control still remains in a few persons. See T. NEsS & E. VOGEL, supra
note 128, at 1-2 to -3; Ginsberg, supra note 117, at 14-15 & n.58.
146. I.R.C. § 1244(c)(3).
147. See notes 22-45 supra and accompanying text.
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